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Abstract 
This paper investigates residential energy consumption in the UK by using a 
novel and topical approach based on behavioural analysis. A key lesson from 
recent advances in behavioural economics is that the responses of individuals 
to both policy incentives and uncertainty may differ from the predictions of 
classical rational optimising behaviour. By employing a focused case study 
approach using both quantitative and qualitative response analysis, it consid-
ers the motivations of residential householders in the UK to reduce fossil fuel 
use, with additional perspectives from UK landlords, a global environmental 
NGO, a senior politician, and two senior stakeholder strategy managers from 
a large energy company. Our interpretative behavioural analysis shows that a 
variety of incentives are necessary to encourage behaviour change. However, 
case study participants largely agree on the beneficial role of government reg-
ulation and efforts to “nudge” them in the right direction with regard to their 
energy use. As a means of more effectively reducing carbon dioxide emissions, 
we conclude that policy should focus on sustainable energy use. The findings 
allow us to understand why important recent policy initiatives such as the UK 
Green Deal failed to achieve their objectives and they suggest lessons for more 
effective incentive based policy making in the field of residential energy con-
sumption. 
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1. Introduction 
This research aims to understand the motivations individuals have to save ener-
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gy and/or use more renewable energy, so that policies such as the Green Deal 
can offer effective incentives. The central approach in this paper is to report on 
the actually observed behaviour and responses of a selected group of energy 
consumers extended to take account of the intentions and responses of residen-
tial landlords, policy makers and energy companies. The core of the results is a 
set of case studies and follow-up interview analysis. These reveal how typical 
policy incentives such as the UK Green Deal, which is explored in Section 2.3, 
are imperfectly designed and why they are likely to fail (as the Green Deal did 
after 3 years of operation). The approach is a new way of evaluating energy poli-
cy, and the analysis centres on two important innovations in research procedure. 
First, the methodology takes engineering based quantitative data obtained in the 
form of temperature and energy use by case study participants. We then analyse 
qualitative data on participants’ energy use by using social science research me-
thods, and interpret our findings through the lens of behavioural economics li-
terature. This mixed methodology allows triangulation of quantitative and qua-
litative data to confirm our findings, which are considered appropriately to con-
trast with the incentives offered in efficiency incentivising policies such as the 
Green Deal that was used in the UK between 2013 and 2015. 
The research aims to clarify several aspects concerning the motivations behind 
domestic energy use, specifically: 
1) From the observed behaviour of case study participants we can infer the 
outlines of an effective energy efficiency policy for domestic energy users such 
as: 
• If the true cost of carbon emissions is not incorporated in the policy, how 
does this diminish the attractiveness of the programme for domestic con-
sumers of energy? The UK Green Deal, for example, failed to adopt this ap-
proach. 
• How best can energy efficiency incentives be simply constructed while send-
ing clear signals about the costs of energy consumption. The UK Green Deal, 
for example, was unnecessarily convoluted and high transaction costs led to 
an uncompetitive interest rate. 
• Should energy savings be calculated on a net present value basis and how can 
certainty for most efficiency measures be introduced to avoid leading con-
sumers to be wary of engaging with the domestic energy policy? 
• How can energy efficiency incentives avoid taking no account of the Re-
bound Effect? Most domestic participants taking part in this research agreed 
that they would be likely to spend energy efficiency savings made in their 
homes on other energy-using capital elsewhere in the economy. 
2) How important is it to take account of behavioural responses to uncertainty 
in energy efficiency incentives? For example could “Nudging” approaches be 
seen by most domestic participants as an effective means of changing behaviour? 
Although this might not be used as a fast acting remedy, could it be more effec-
tive if used in tandem with government regulation? 
3) Is there a disconnection between intention and behaviour with regard to 
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domestic energy use, an impact on which would lessen the spur provided by 
energy efficiency incentives? The research is designed to reveal examples where 
domestic participants in the UK do not always align their intended energy using 
behaviour with their actual energy use behaviour. For example, some partici-
pants may allow thermal comfort to take precedence over their avowed intention 
to use energy more efficiently. In other words the motivation is lacking to 
achieve both aims. 
The paper is organized in the following way: in the remainder of section one 
we discuss energy use; section two presents a literature review; in section three 
we present our methodology, and in section four present case study results and 
interpretation; section five concludes and discusses the implications of the re-
search for policy development.  
1.1. Factors Determining Energy Use 
Energy use in buildings depends on the interaction between the occupants [1], 
the building fabric [2], the way energy is delivered [3] and the local climate [4]. 
1) Occupants: 
The energy requirements of the occupants need to be considered. Questions 
such as property tenure, number, income and age of occupants, the time the oc-
cupants spend in the property, their behaviour patterns/preferences and level of 
satisfaction while there, need to be addressed along with the implications for 
energy use.  
2) The building fabric needs to be assessed in terms of type of construction, 
size, layout, design and energy efficiency.  
3) Does the way energy is used in the building make economic sense? How ef-
ficiently spread is heating, lighting and ventilation throughout the building? 
4) The location of the building is a key factor as the local climate could have a 
major impact on the energy requirements of the structure. 
1.2. UK Domestic Energy Requirements 
It is of significance to see how energy is consumed between sectors in the UK so 
that the relevance of the residential sector can be determined. Final energy con-
sumption in 2010 for example was (Table 1). 
Table 1 shows that household energy use is of critical importance if fossil fuels  
 
Table 1. Final energy consumption in 2010 [5]. 
Sector Percentage 
transport 35% 
domestic 30.5% 
industrial 17.3% 
commercial 6.2% 
other-energy use 
non-energy use* 
5.7% 
5.3% 
*non-energy use includes such items as chemical feedstocks, etc. 
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are to be displaced by renewable energy, and the UK government is to meet its 
target of reducing carbon emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. Renewable 
power sources are needed to supply the residential sector, and they must be de-
veloped in a way that balances the costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
and thus the price paid by consumers, with the benefits of moving towards a ze-
ro carbon economy.  
In the UK economy, for example, the most recent experience of a direct ener-
gy efficiency incentive scheme was the Green Deal which was started in January 
2013, with the objective of encouraging residential property owners to install 
energy efficiency measures in their property and with a commensurate implied 
aim of a reduction in carbon emissions. Along with a new Energy Company Ob-
ligation (ECO) provided for in the Energy Act (2011) [6], the Green Deal re-
placed the previous Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and the Com-
munity Energy Saving Programme (CESP) which expired in 2012.  
The core of such energy efficiency schemes is often designed as the provision 
of finance for the installation of domestic energy efficiency measures. The sav-
ings accrued from the more efficient use of energy provides the means of loan 
repayment, since energy efficiency investments are recouped through energy bill 
repayments. The financial charge can be to the property’s energy/electricity bill, 
and while remaining a charge connected to the house regardless of who occupies 
or owns it. This is why in the UK’s 2013-2015 example, the “Golden Rule”, 
which was a legal requirement, specified that any charge attached to an energy 
saving measure must be less than the expected savings from it. In this way the 
householder would, in theory, always benefit from having the energy efficiency 
measure installed in their property.  
While direct incentivisation of energy efficiency in the home has now been 
largely discontinued in the UK; the emissions targets are challenging, so policy 
to encourage energy efficiency remains critical. An effective policy regime must 
be informed by an understanding of the financial and non-financial incentives 
which motivate householders to make improvements in the energy efficiency 
and sustainability of their property. This is especially important with regard to 
space and water heating which accounts for around 80% of residential energy 
use [7]. What kind of framework will motivate people to choose heat pumps 
over gas boilers, for example? UK Green Deal projects alone, i.e., without subsi-
dy, were effectively limited to basic cavity and loft insulation, and draught 
proofing, thus restricting the possible energy savings that could be achieved by 
the implementation of a wider range of energy efficiency measures [8]. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Residential Energy Demand Behaviour 
There have been many approaches to the assessment of occupant behaviour 
around energy use. Much of the work is based on conventional optimising mod-
els of rational economic agents. However, recent developments in behavioural 
economics, i.e. the incorporation into mainstream economics of findings from 
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cognitive psychology and decision making, have led to considerable re-thinking 
about the design of incentive based policies to change behaviour. The early work 
on behavioural analysis of personal decision making was done by Kahneman 
and Tversky, and it is well described by Kahneman [9] and Thaler [10]. A basic 
idea that emerges is that it is critical to understand how actual small focus 
groups of participants respond in practice to investigations of how they treat in-
centives and uncertainty. The findings demonstrated many times over that ab-
stract theorising about the optimal responses of rational economic man to policy 
incentives and uncertainty is an imperfect guide to actual behaviour.  
In this section we analyse the behavioural economics literature, including how 
a person’s social identity determines their choices [11] [12]. For example, we 
know that individuals in defined social groups tend to identify with particular 
behaviours in that group but from a policy perspective this is problematic be-
cause influencing social identity takes time and pathways from policy to effect 
are unclear.  
Mainstream Expected Utility Theory (EUT) purports that decisions between 
alternatives are made on the basis of the utility value of outcomes [13]. This val-
ue is based on the probability of a given outcome for each choice. While it can be 
argued that it is easier to conceptualise utility with respect to, for example, in-
vestment decisions (increased monetary gain equals increased utility) it can be a 
difficult concept to define when making choices which involve such nebulous 
factors as emotion, culture or the effects of climate change.  
A recurrent theme in Thaler [14] is that market-based approaches are incom-
plete, as they assume people are highly rational and unemotional. Thaler & 
Sunstein [15] suggest that people often make poor choices because they are sus-
ceptible to many routine biases. They argue that the scope to make poor choices 
is wide, and includes education, personal finance, healthcare, what makes them 
happy, and interaction with the planet itself.  
Nudge theory, whose foundations stem from Kahneman’s work on heuristics 
[9], implies public and private organisations can help people make ‘better’ 
choices in their daily lives. The theory is an attempt to improve our understand-
ing of heuristic influences on human behaviour. These heuristic influences are 
central to decision-making given the sheer scale of the available choices a person 
is faced with. Nudge theory accepts the reality of people’s behaviour, and seeks 
to provide choices which encourage positive, helpful decision-making. These 
choices ideally benefit the wider interests of society. Table 2 outlines some of the 
heuristics in nudge theory.  
In addition the Rebound Effect [16], [17] is an important research area ig-
nored by the Green Deal. The direct rebound effect makes energy cheaper and 
on an aggregate scale increased energy efficiency can lead to increased economic 
growth. The net effect can be an overall increase in energy use. 
2.2. Residential Emissions 
James’ [7] review of emissions reductions in the UK residential sector concludes  
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Table 2. Nudge Theory: Authors’ summary. 
Heuristics in “nudge” theory-overview (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) 
1. Anchoring and  
adjustment 
Using known facts and adjusting them to estimate or decide  
something which is unknown. 
2. Familiarity and  
Status quo bias 
The more familiar something is, the more frequently, it is 
used/communicated. A misplaced sense of trust may be developed. 
These heuristics are influenced by advertising and mass media, and 
fear of the unknown. 
3. Over-optimism 
People tend to under-estimate costs, timescales, and challenges, and 
to over-estimate rewards and the ease of dealing with unknown 
things. 
4. Loss aversion 
The tendency for people to value actual possessions (or gains) more 
than potential possessions (or gains)-this creates inertia and  
impedes making changes. People do not like to lose possession of 
things, irrespective of their actual value/importance. 
5. Framing 
Framing is an individual’s method of heuristically understanding 
reality. It can therefore include many ways of distorting the  
attractiveness/unattractiveness of something. 
6. Conforming with the 
population 
People have the need for affirmation, and wish to avoid risk or 
embarrassment. Cultural factors enhance these effects. 
 
that reductions of under 2% per annum are likely to be delivered by 2020 (under 
the assumption of business as usual), when in fact overall reductions of approx-
imately 6% per annum are needed to meet legally binding government targets. In-
terestingly, this research concludes the key barrier to achieving satisfactory resi-
dential carbon emission reduction is psychological.  
In 2009, 15% of direct UK CO2 emissions were from the residential sector and 
this increased to 27% if indirect emissions are included. Clearly there is significant 
potential for the reduction of emissions via energy efficiency.  
Figure 1 shows the trend in CO2 emissions (in Million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide) in the UK residential sector from 1990 to 2010 by final user and by source 
[18] [19]. “By source” does not include shipping and aviation. 
The figure shows that the absolute value of CO2 emissions has remained largely 
unchanged, and James [7] contends that this is because improvements in energy 
efficiency over the last 20 years have largely been absorbed by increases in de-
mand. This increased demand can be explained with reference to two factors. First, 
it may be partly attributed to the rebound effect, where energy savings from the 
improved energy efficiency measures result in a less than proportionate reduction 
in energy use, because the expenditure saved is re-spent on energy consuming 
goods and services, including higher residential comfort levels. 
Second, the switch from coal to gas-fired electricity generation in the 1990s re-
sulted in a small decline in indirect emissions, and this helped to outweigh the in-
creasing use of electricity to power household appliances. The Committee on Cli-
mate Change (CCC) [20] concluded that improved insulation and heating system 
efficiency has been broadly offset by higher average internal temperatures in  
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Figure 1. CO2 emissions from the residential sector in the period 1990-2010 [7] p. 7. 
 
homes resulting in a fairly flat profile for direct residential emissions observed in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2 [21] outlines the trend in UK CO2 emissions from the residential sec-
tor in the period 1985-2013, and shows that the contribution of the residential 
sector to a reduction in carbon emissions has so far been modest at approximately 
12%. Particularly given the large proportion of final energy consumption ac-
counted for by the residential sector, this suggests that there may be scope for re-
ducing overall CO2 emissions through carefully crafted policies aimed at the resi-
dential sector. The figure also shows that the residential emissions: GDP ratio 
(right hand scale) has fallen more steeply over the period, which may be explained 
by increased economic growth outside of the domestic sector, as well as domestic 
energy efficiency being counterbalanced by rising demand for power related to a 
proliferation in the number of domestic appliances and gadgets requiring charg-
ing. The sharp decline in CO2 emissions towards the end of the period could be 
explained by a fall in domestic energy demand due to the deep economic recession 
which began in 2008. 
The CCC’s 3rd Carbon Budget 2018-2022 [20] sets out the steps required to re-
duce carbon emissions in the period to 2022, and states that policy measures are 
required to ensure the insulation of 90% of all lofts and cavity walls, as well as 2 
million solid wall dwellings (around 20% of the stock of solid wall dwellings). In 
addition, the budget requires a replacement of 13 million boilers with newer more 
efficient condensing boilers, along with a significant increase in appliance effi-
ciency. It is predicted that these measures could result in a 17 MtCO2 reduction in 
annual CO2 emissions from the approximately 26 million households that make 
up the UK residential sector. This equates to a reduction of about 15% compared 
with 2008 levels.  
Despite these ambitious sounding targets, the third carbon budget would deliver 
only 1.7% annual emissions reductions (proportion of direct emissions from the 
residential sector in Table 1). This implies average annual reductions of around 
4.5% would be required to meet the fourth carbon budget (2023-2027) which is 
designed to achieve progress sufficient to meet the 2030 target of 60% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels [22]. The Committee on Climate 
Change propose greater reductions with each carbon budget to reflect  
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Figure 2. Trend in residential energy use in the period 1985-2013 [21]. 
 
the cumulative effect of energy-saving measures. There is no implied recognition 
of any rebound effect in these budgets. 
2.3. An Example of Energy Efficiency Policy: The UK’s Green Deal 
In this section we review the design of the most ambitious UK government policy 
to enhance residential energy saving; this was the incentive scheme called the 
“Green Deal”. The main components of the Green Deal scheme were on-site as-
sessment, the installation of the efficiency measures, the provision of finance and 
the facility to attach a charge to a property’s energy bill, and the delivery of contin-
uing advice and support to consumers [23]. 
The Green Deal Plan was a new type of interest bearing loan secured by a charge 
on the property and householders would be liable for the loan so long as they were 
the electricity bill payers at the property. To qualify for the Green Deal Plan, pro-
posed energy efficiency measures installed were required to demonstrate predicted 
energy cost savings, which according to the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change website, would be mainly on space heating. A Green Deal Quality Mark, 
which could be used only by approved Green Deal assessors, providers and instal-
lers, was intended to reassure the public regarding the quality of energy improve-
ments. The Green Deal provider set out the key terms of the contract with the 
consumer under the Green Deal Plan including interest rate (which was fixed) and 
repayment amounts. Repayments relating to Green Deal installations were col-
lected by the electricity supplier via the electricity bill and passed on to the Green 
Deal Provider. Prospective purchasers or tenants of properties were alerted to the 
existence of a Green Deal Loan through mandatory Energy Performance Certifi-
cates (EPC). Green Deal loans were regulated under the Consumer Credit Act 
1974. Separately to money owed to the Green Deal Provider, there may have been 
a charge to the householder for the Green Deal assessment, made by the initial 
Green Deal Assessor. 
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A basic structure of the Green Deal is represented in Figure 3. 
Essentially then, the Green Deal attempted to incentivise householders to install 
energy efficiency measures by offering advice from trusted sources combined with 
a long term financing package that, it was hoped, consumers would find attractive. 
However, as we have described, the operation of the policy was highly complex 
and transaction costs were necessarily high. 
From this review of energy saving incentives in theory and an important exam-
ple in practice, it may be possible to learn lessons about policy design from a de-
tailed analysis of the behaviour of a closely monitored group of participants in an 
energy consumption experiment. We now turn to describing the case study ap-
proach that we used to investigate these issues further. 
 
 
Figure 3. Basic structure of the green deal (adapted from [23]). 
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3. Methodology 
The research involved modelling predicted energy use in seven case study proper-
ties based on both quantitative and qualitative data. Actual energy use was also 
measured at case study properties, and temperatures were recorded in the main 
living area and the main bedroom at each property. Qualitative data was gathered 
though interviews with one case study participant at each property. Further evi-
dence of consumer attitudes was gained through semi structured interviews with 
stakeholder groups including landlords, an environmental group, an energy com-
pany, and a member of parliament. Case study participants also took part in a fo-
cus group session after most of the empirical research had been completed. 
3.1. The Sampling Process 
Following the literature [24], we considered the characteristics of the sample care-
fully. For example, it was important that participants were aware of the relation-
ship between energy use and climate change, energy security, pollution and re-
source availability. A truly random sample of participants drawn from the wider 
population might have held viewpoints based on a lack of (or incorrect) factual 
information regarding the use of fossil fuels. This may have yielded less construc-
tive opinions and possibly introduced more bias than opinions garnered from the 
purposive sample of participants who took part in the research [25].  
Ideally we would have obtained a representative and unbiased subgroup drawn 
from the UK population. However, it was not feasible to obtain a random sample 
due to resource constraints and insufficient information about the potential sam-
ple population.  
Given this information deficit, we chose to employ the technique of “snowbal-
ling”, which involves starting with one or two representative participants known to 
us, and then asking these participants to introduce the researcher to other mem-
bers of the relevant population [26] [27].  
Once the participants had been selected by given ethical participation, we con-
sidered potential innate bias, but found that it was not a problem among this sam-
ple. Firstly because we had no prior knowledge of the opinions of any of the par-
ticipants with regard to energy use and climate change. Secondly the specification 
of the precise interview questions had not been decided. 
The sample participants were representative of the total potential population in 
the sense that their knowledge of energy use and climate change was expected to 
be similar, because 1) the participating householders were all familiar with the is-
sues of energy use in houses through their professional experience; 2) the landlord 
participants were all aware of Green Deal initiatives; 3) the NGO, political and 
business respondents had specialised involvement with the use of energy policy in 
relation to the housing stock. We did not attempt to choose participants who were 
representative of the general potential population in other respects. For example, 
there was no deliberate choice made to achieve any balance in terms of gender, 
age, income or any other variable. However, the particular way in which the sam-
ple participants were representative of the total study population was considered 
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sufficient in order to assess their motivations with regard to this research [26] [27] 
[28]. As such, the results and conclusions drawn from both the qualitative and 
quantitative data produced by the research are considered valid. Further details on 
the methodology and sampling methods used are available by reference to Hallin 
[29]. 
3.2. Winter Temperature Measurement 
Hobo Pendant Temperature Data Loggers (UA-001-08) were calibrated and then 
placed in the main living room and the main bedroom in each case study property, 
and recorded temperature every 30 minutes. Monitoring took place from midnight 
16 October 2013 until midnight 11 February 2014, covering most of the autumn 
and winter months, when energy demand would be highest. In addition to re-
cording temperature in the case study properties, external temperature was meas-
ured with a Hobo Pendant Temperature Data Logger. All temperature data was 
collected from a single urban area of the East Midlands, so the external tempera-
ture data is relevant to all the case study properties. The data from the Hobo Pen-
dants was downloaded at the end of the monitoring period using Hoboware soft-
ware. 
3.3. Winter Energy Use 
Actual energy use over the winter monitoring period of four months was meas-
ured from gas and electric meter readings at the properties. Gas meter readings 
were taken in cubic feet or cubic metres, (depending on the meter configurations) 
which were then converted to kilowatt hours.  
Electricity meter readings are in kilowatt hours. When meters are dual rate, each 
reading is in kilowatt hours. So combined together, the total units represent the 
amount of energy used from the electricity supply. Receiving electricity on a dual 
rate basis may or may not be cost-effective, depending on the time of day when 
most energy is used. The cost will depend on the particular supplier tariff, and this 
can change over time. So for the purpose of this study, the comparative figure of 
interest was the actual energy use, rather than its cost. 
Total energy use in kilowatt hours from each case study was calculated by com-
bining gas consumption (where appropriate) and electricity consumption over the 
measured period. 
3.4. Predictive Energy Modelling 
Predictive energy modelling is a tool for estimating energy use in particular build-
ings, and was used in the UK residential sector to calculate whether a property was 
suitable for support under the Green Deal scheme. 
The modelling method we used is the Standard Assessment Procedure, SAP 
2009 [30], which is the government’s preferred method for assessing energy use in 
the residential sector. The Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) establishes 
energy performance by measuring annual energy consumption per unit of floor 
area, conveyed in kWh/m2/year. Energy performance is expressed by three indica-
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tors; a SAP rating, an Environmental Impact rating and a Dwelling CO2 emission 
rate. Because they are adjusted for floor area, SAP ratings are independent of size 
of building for a given built form. Further details of the methodology are given in 
Appendix A. 
3.5. Qualitative Research 
The qualitative research consisted of semi-structured interviews to explore atti-
tudes to energy with the seven case study participants (Table 3), three landlords of 
residential property (Table 4), two energy company executives, one environmental 
group executive, and a senior politician who represented the local area as a mem-
ber of Parliament (Table 5).  
 
Table 3. Case study participants: occupants (pseudonyms used). 
Participant Gender Age Range Occupation Property Type 
Property 
Age 
Tenure 
Anne Female 18 to 29 
Energy related 
researcher 
Semi-detached 
house 
1930 Tenant 
Arabella Female 30 to 40 Energy related 
researcher 
Semi-detached 
house 
1935 Tenant 
Juliette Female 30 to 40 Teacher 
Semi-detached 
house 
1931 Owner 
Jane Female 30 to 40 Energy related 
researcher 
Terraced house 1890 Tenant 
Robert Male 18 to 29 
Energy related 
researcher 
Terraced House 2012 Owner 
Gwen Female 18 to 29 Energy related 
researcher 
Flat 2000 Tenant 
Wendy Female 30 to 40 
Energy related 
researcher 
Flat 1880 Tenant 
 
Table 4. Research participants: landlords (pseudonyms used). 
Participant Gender Age Range Occupation 
Number of buy to let 
properties 
Ava Female 40 to 50 Print estimator 4 
Mike Male 40 to 50 Business owner 3 
Patrick Male 30 to 40 IT manager 3 
 
Table 5. Environmental, energy and political representatives (pseudonyms used). 
Participant Gender Age Range Occupation Representing 
Alice Female 40 to 50 Government Minister UK Coalition government 
Daryl Male 30 to 40 Senior policy executive Large energy company 
James Male 30 to 40 Senior policy executive Large energy company 
Pauline Female 30 to 40 
Climate and  
energy specialist 
Large environmental group 
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The results of our qualitative research were combined with the quantitative 
research results in order to triangulate the findings by comparing predicted 
energy use with actual energy use. Also participants’ interview responses were 
compared with their actual behaviour. Measured temperatures in each case 
study property gave some appreciation of the participants’ thermal comfort 
range and its influence on their actual energy use. 
Interview questions were devised on the basis of a number of key questions 
arising from previous research (e.g. [9] [11] [12] [14] [16] [17] [31] [32] [33]) 
These are listed below. 
Key Issues Used to Devise Interview Questions 
1) How do domestic residents think about their energy use? 
2) How does the form of energy residential consumers use appeal to their 
ideological, health or materialistic/economic consumer needs? 
3) What impact has culture on energy use and can this be changed with edu-
cation policy or through commercial/political marketing?  
4) How does more information on domestic energy consumption, such as 
smart meters which provide real-time information on energy use, automatically 
encourage greater energy efficiency or is it more complicated than this?  
5) How important/possible is it for domestic consumers to measure their 
energy use in all energy related activity (so they can be aware of technology effi-
ciency rebound effects)? 
6) How responsible do domestic consumers feel for their efficient use of 
energy? 
7) How could tax incentives (which replace up-front subsidy or future gov-
ernment cost) be devised on a sectoral basis to make a difference? 
3.6. Data Analysis 
The analysis of qualitative data may be approached in numerous ways [24]. 
While the concepts revealed by our data analysis were linked to the literature re-
view, the inferential data derived from the analysis was not constrained in any 
way by predetermined theory. 
Coding is one of the most common methods used to analyse and uncover 
concepts from qualitative data. Codes can be attached to words, phrases and 
sentences or whole paragraphs. This research used inferential coding to assign 
meaning to the descriptive or inferential information revealed during the study 
[24] [25], i.e. answers to interview questions and focus group responses.  
Our source data was divided into the subcategories of UK case studies, UK 
focus group and other UK stakeholders and also into nodes, which contain data 
about specific ideas/themes of analysis. Nodes were also included for positive, 
negative and mixed views. Inferential answers could then easily be assigned a 
particular viewpoint by including it in the relevant node. Matrix coding queries 
were done to combine results from different nodes. For example, attitudes to-
 
 
1NVIVO software was used to organise and analyse the qualitative data. 
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wards climate change might be inferred from participants’ attitudes towards 
other factors, such as finance, how responsible people feel for their energy effi-
ciency, etc. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Case Study Predicted and Actual Energy Use 
Summary of UK case study participant’s household temperature and energy 
data (predicted and extrapolated actual) 
The following composite Figure 4 and Figure 5 show average lounge and 
bedroom temperatures for each UK case study participant over the winter pe-
riod. Table 6 shows a composite of total predicted and actual energy use by par-
ticipant. 
4.1.1. Energy Use 
Table 6 shows that for most participants (not Juliette and Anne), predicted an-
nual energy use is higher than actual energy use, in some cases significantly. One 
reason for the lack of correlation between predicted and actual energy use is that 
SAP predictive analysis uses “standard occupancy” assumptions that do not al-
ways reflect actual occupancy patterns or behaviour. 
The concept of standard occupancy is important in rating energy use in prop-
erties, because it renders Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) a useful tool by 
which consumers may compare one property with another. So although the 
Green Deal allows some consideration of occupancy, (properties are classified as 
light, medium or heavy in terms of energy use), the SAP assessment concentrates  
 
 
Figure 4. Average lounge temperatures. 
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Figure 5. Average bedroom temperatures. 
 
Table 6. Case study energy use. 
Total Energy by 
Type 
Predicted 
(SAP) 
kWh/m2/year 
Actual 
kWh/m2/year 
Predicted 
energy use 
difference 
from actual 
(%) 
UK Case 
Study  
Participant 
Gas & Electricity 317 352 −10% Anne 
Gas & Electricity 288 220 +31% Arabella 
Gas & Electricity 167 107 +56% Gwen 
Gas & Electricity 262 205 +28% Jane 
Gas & Electricity 199 220 −10% Juliette 
Gas & Electricity 177 139 +27% Robert 
Electricity 222 98 +26% Wendy 
 
on the fabric of the building and the means of energy delivery. 
Therefore the SAP predicative analysis of energy use is likely to over-estimate 
energy use in a four-bedroom property which has only one occupant rather 
than a family of four. Conversely, it is likely to under-estimate the energy use of 
a small flat occupied by a large family using considerable amounts of heat and 
hot water. 
Thus the standard predictive analysis can have a wide variation when com-
pared with actual energy use in a property. Nevertheless, recommended energy 
efficiency measures do make sense if they have an impact on cost and individu-
al thermal comfort. 
However, even allowing for this latitude in the SAP projection as compared 
with actual energy use, in many of our UK case studies the discrepancy is very 
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large. For example Robert actually uses less than half the electricity predicted, 
even though SAP ignores any energy requirements for cooking or the use of 
other electrical items, such as computers and televisions, etc. The energy pre-
diction would have been even higher if SAP took these other items into ac-
count. 
Gwen lives alone in a two-bedroom flat, yet her actual space heating energy 
use is almost 40% less than predicted, even though whatever heat she used 
would permeate most areas of her flat. 
Jane lives alone in a two-bedroom mid-terraced house, and uses around half 
the electricity predicted by SAP. 
Juliette lives alone in a three-bedroom semi-detached house. Her energy use 
is actually slightly more than that predicted by SAP. 
Wendy lives alone in a one-bedroom mid floor flat. All her energy needs are 
supplied by electricity. She uses around 44% of the energy predicted. 
Anne shares a three-bedroom semi-detached house with two other people. 
Her space heating usage is slightly more than predicted, and her electricity use 
is considerably more, no doubt reflecting on energy use by electrical items such 
as computers amongst members of the household. 
Arabella shares a two-bedroom semi-detached house with one other person. 
Her space heating use (gas) is only about 70% of that predicted, yet electricity 
use is marginally higher. However, she has a bedroom electric heater, which she 
uses to ensure thermal comfort. 
Our research therefore highlights the limitations of SAP in terms of predict-
ing energy use and consequential potential savings under the Green Deal.  
4.1.2. Temperature 
Overall, Robert and Juliette (both homeowners) live in properties with the 
highest average temperatures and Jane’s property records the lowest tempera-
tures. Yet, because Robert lives in a newly built house, his energy bills are much 
lower than Jane’s. Wendy’s energy use is very low, but this is at least in part be-
cause she is absent from her flat on a number of occasions during the monitoring 
period. Gwen’s relatively modern flat also means that energy bills are low-around 
half that of Jane’s-even though the data indicates that she lives in relative thermal 
comfort. Arabella’s bedroom temperature is consistently higher than the tempera-
ture in her lounge, indicating that she uses her electric bedroom heater frequently. 
At this point we turn to Tables 7-9 which collates responses to the qualitative 
questions reflecting the key issues of energy awareness that were discussed above. 
A summary of Other UK Stakeholders responses (landlords, environmental 
group, energy Company, politician) is shown in Table 8 and Focus Group res-
ponses in Table 9. 
4.2. UK Case Studies 
The UK case studies were chosen in order to try to gain deeper understanding of 
what factors would be important in motivating the participants to use energy 
more efficiently and/or more sustainably. The responses were related to key  
S. Hallin et al. 
 
30 
Table 7. UK case studies*. 
Inferred Statement Mixed View 
Negative 
view 
Positive 
View Balance of view 
Collective action  
is important 4 0 2 Uncertain 
Useful if we could choose 
the energy we get  
supplied to our home 
1 0 3 Positive 
Education is the most 
important thing 2 2 3 Uncertain 
People are influenced by 
the culture around them 1 3 3 Uncertain 
What is your attitude to 
nuclear power 3 1 3 Uncertain 
Differential tariffs are a 
good idea 2 1 4 Uncertain 
Smart meters are useful 4 0 3 Uncertain 
People don’t think that 
rationally 0 0 7 Positive 
The government should 
nudge us in the right 
direction 
1 0 4 Positive 
Government regulation is 
important in residential 
energy use 
0 1 4 Positive 
What is your view on 
population and energy 
(bad effects) 
2 4 1 Negative 
Financial situation is the 
driver behind energy use 
1 1 3 Positive 
What is your attitude to 
the Green Deal 
3 3 1 Uncertain 
How would you feel about 
being given a personal 
carbon allowance 
3 1 3 Uncertain 
Would you be prepared to 
pay a carbon tax 
3 2 2 Uncertain 
*Positive views agreed with the inferred statement, Negative views disagreed with the inferred statement, 
Uncertain views were mixed. This applies to all other groups in the study. 
 
strands in the literature covering occupant behaviour and energy use, and par-
ticipants views were considered in relation to these strands. 
The Green Deal was the UK government’s flagship policy to improve energy 
efficiency in existing residential buildings.  
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Table 8. Other UK stakeholders. 
Inferred Statement Mixed 
View 
Negative 
view 
Positive 
View 
Balance of view 
Collective action is important 1 0 6 Positive 
Useful if we could choose the 
energy we get supplied  
to our home 
0 0 3 Positive 
Education is the most  
important thing 
5 0 2 Uncertain 
People are influenced by  
the culture around them 
2 1 4 Uncertain 
Attitude to nuclear power 3 1 2 Uncertain 
Differential tariffs are a good idea 1 1 3 Positive 
Smart meters are useful 1 0 6 Positive 
The rebound effect is important 4 0 0 Uncertain 
People don’t think that rationally 0 0 6 Positive 
The government should nudge us 
in the right direction 
1 0 6 Positive 
 
Table 9. Focus group responses. 
Inferred  
Statement 
Mixed 
View 
Negative 
view 
Positive 
View 
Balance of view 
Attitude to the Green Deal 8 0 1 Uncertain 
Financial situation is the  
driver behind energy use 
6 0 7 Uncertain 
Government regulation is 
important in residential  
energy use 
0 0 5 Positive 
The government should 
nudge us in the right direction 0 0 11 Positive 
paying a carbon tax 6 0 0 Uncertain 
The rebound effect is  
important with regard to 
policy. 
2 0 5 Positive 
 
“The Green Deal will deliver energy saving packages to millions of home across 
the country” [34]. 
However as Figure 6 and Figure 7 reveal, the government’s own statistics 
show that the Green Deal itself had little effect, with 97% of installed efficiency 
measures delivered instead through a different policy, the Energy Company Ob-
ligation (ECO). The ECO replaced two previous schemes (Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target-CERT, and Community Energy Saving Programme-CESP) 
and provides energy efficiency measures to low income and vulnerable consum-
ers and those living in “hard-to-treat” properties. 
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Figure 6. UK cavity wall & loft insulation 2008-2014, [35] QSR P. 36. 
 
 
Figure 7. Solid wall insulation 2008-2014, [35] QSR P. 36. 
 
The number of households in Britain is approximately 26 million, and of these 
around 8 million have solid walls. Of the remaining 18 million, nearly 14 million 
have cavity wall insulation. The total number of properties with satisfactory loft 
insulation is just over 16 million. Details of cavity wall and loft insulation are 
shown in Figure 6. So the potential number of households who could benefit 
from better insulation is very high. 
However of the approximately 8 million solid wall household properties, very 
few have been insulated with internal/external wall insulation since 2008. Ironi-
cally, as the right hand side of Figure 7 shows, only around fifty solid wall insu-
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lations were installed in the year from September 2013, during which the Green 
Deal was the flagship policy for residential property emissions reductions.  
Figure 6 and Figure 7 clearly show that progress in installation of insulation 
measures in domestic properties was comparatively more successful prior to the 
onset of the Green Deal in January 2013. 
The behavioural economics insights associated with Kahneman and Thaler, 
suggest at least three behavioural characteristics that distort the mainstream ex-
pected utility theory approach: 
• reference dependence, i.e. households will focus only on changes to wealth, 
rather than allowing for the absolute level of wealth following the decision;  
• loss aversion, households will be more sensitive to (even small) losses than to 
gains of the same absolute value;  
• use of decision weights that are non-linearly dependent on but not equal to 
objective probabilities, resulting in the overweighting of low tail probabilities 
(large losses or gains with low objective probability) and underweighting of 
high tail probabilities (small losses and gains with high probabilities).  
These three factors are amongst those which contribute to the empirical ob-
servation that many household investment decisions which would be adopted in 
an EUT model are rejected in practice.  
The Green Deal appears to have been designed to address a capital market 
problem instead of an energy efficiency or emissions reduction target. House 
owners have always been free to fund energy efficiency improvements through 
bank loans secured on the property, but the Green Deal offered an alternative, 
arguably unnecessary, source of finance through a loan from the house owner’s 
energy supplier secured on the continued existence of an electricity or gas supply 
contract. 
There was a fundamental contradiction in the Green Deal. While the avowed 
purpose of the policy was to improve energy efficiency in order to drive down 
greenhouse gas emissions which impose a positive social cost of carbon on the 
economy, this social cost was not used to evaluate the energy savings. If the cost 
of externalities was included as advocated by Tol [32] and Stern [33], there 
would be a substantial incentive to use more sustainable energy. This may, for 
example, have resulted in increased demand for domestic ground and air source 
heat pumps which currently require subsidy to be competitive with fossil fuel 
generated energy. Put more simply, the policy was predicated on the assumption 
that the market price of energy understated the social cost of energy consump-
tion, but it was the market price rather than the social cost that was used in the 
evaluations. 
Finally, there was much confusion in the choice of discount rates implied in 
the calculations. The capital market nominal rate of interest for new property 
loans during this period (when inflation was negligible) was in the region of 3 - 4 
percent per year (this is the rate that EUT would expect consumers to use), while 
the government’s real social discount rate for climate change policy was in the 
region of 1 percent per year (as advocated for example by the Stern Review). 
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Nevertheless the rate of interest offered on Green Deal loans was almost 7 per-
cent per year fixed into the future, for the estimated lifespan of the energy im-
provement measure. Thaler [10] reflects on experience with the Green Deal 
during his work with the Behavioural Insights Team of the UK Government. In 
discussion with DECC, the problem of inadequate insulation of attics was ad-
dressed by a behavioural incentive in the form of a “make it easy” formula, whe-
reby household inertia to make the effort would be overcome by an arrangement 
for the attic insulation provider to tidy up and de-clutter the householder’s attic 
for an additional price equal to approximately the cost of the insulation itself, a 
total of about £370 or 18 percent of the median monthly UK household pre-tax 
income. Take-up of this offer was negligible, suggesting that the behavioural ob-
stacles to even low-cost high-return investments have been significantly unde-
restimated. This research supports this view, 
Additional reasons that the Green Deal was not effective include: 
• The savings calculated to obtain Green Deal finance were not determined on 
a net present value basis. Nominal savings over the life of the energy efficient 
measure were estimated, and only savings made in the first year after installa-
tion were guaranteed.  
• The structure of the Green Deal was convoluted, with assessors originally in-
tended to be independent from installers and providers (as is confirmed by 
Juliette’s experience, this is not always the case). This meant transaction costs 
were increased for all the actors involved with energy saving installations. 
• Very few energy improvement measures were likely to be cost-effective [8]. 
Case Study participants (although not other UK stakeholders) viewed the re-
bound effect as another reason the Green Deal was an ineffective policy. Saund-
ers [16], Sorrell [17] and many others, including Adetutu, Glass and Weyman- 
Jones [36], confirm that improved energy efficiency results in a less than propor-
tionate reduction in energy consumption. In fact, research shows that in the ag-
gregate, increased energy efficiency can lead to increased economic growth [37]. 
If this growth depends on energy from fossil fuels, then CO2 emissions are likely 
to increase, at least partially offsetting residential efficiency savings. 
This research has confirmed that residential energy use is in part determined 
by human irrationality and policies based on Nudge theory. Research partici-
pants generally concurred that their thinking was not always highly rational. 
Government in particular was viewed by most participants as having the capa-
bility to influence behaviour around energy use in the residential sector. Gov-
ernment policy has the potential to alter heuristic behaviour to achieve more fa-
vourable outcomes using marketing and advertising measures to influence opi-
nion. Importantly, regulation has the capacity to influence energy use, and in 
fact does so for example through increasingly rigorous building regulations. The 
success of regulatory standards in driving behaviour offers scope for future poli-
cy. For example, minimum energy efficiency standards prior to the sale of a 
property could be mandated. Of course the challenge of energy policy is that 
government cares about or at least is legally obliged to meet energy targets, while 
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individual consumers have no such care or obligation, thus potentially making 
policy implementation politically difficult.  
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The research found definite support for financial incentives as a successful me-
chanism to influence behaviour. However incentives must be aligned with indi-
vidual consumer needs in order to be effective. This means that policies designed 
to influence energy demand behaviour in the residential sector need to be 
nuanced, perhaps targeting different groups of people in specific ways. Variables 
such as income levels, cultural mores (incorporating educational, ideological 
ideas, and views on social identity), heuristic bias, and the potential for people to 
make choices need to be taken into account. Developing policy that can success-
fully deal with such a wide variety of influences is clearly difficult. This research 
shows that the Green Deal, the government’s primary residential energy policy, 
was never effective. Apart from its convoluted, costly structure, and because of 
the rebound effect, it did not effectively address the important issue of climate 
change. From a financial point of view, without subsidy, the rewards to the con-
sumer were too meagre and uncertain to constitute a reasonable incentive. The 
non-financial incentives may have become more important over time, with slow 
cultural change. 
A change in residential energy policy could involve a change in emphasis 
away from energy efficiency to energy sustainability. One possibility might be to 
tax fossil fuels (effectively a carbon tax), so that the price of energy from rene-
wables and nuclear power became competitive [38]. As consumers consistently 
resist tax increases, a finding supported by this study, the revenue raised from a 
new tax could be rebated, so that the net effect was no increase in energy cost to 
the consumer. However, a tax of this nature would make renewable energy more 
attractive as a form of energy supply. Such a policy might shift demand away 
from fossil fuels and towards renewables. As the policy progressed, the tax levy 
from fossil fuels could be reduced and some subsidy would be required from the 
government to mitigate the impact of the higher price of renewable energy. 
However, consumers might accept a gentle increase in energy prices and in any 
case, this might be compensated by a reduction in renewable energy prices due 
to an increase in efficiency. 
Another possibility could be to levy an environmental tax on existing residen-
tial property that did not meet a certain standard of sustainability. This could be 
linked as a progressive surcharge on the local property tax, and thus property 
values. It could be made clear that the surcharge would increase by a fixed per-
centage each year, thus incentivising residential consumers to act immediately to 
improve the sustainability of their energy use. 
A reversion to a system where large energy companies were mandated to im-
prove energy efficiency/sustainability in the residential sector would be wise, as 
this study has shown that take-up of energy efficiency measures was unsatisfac-
tory. This would be straightforward and could be more cost-effective than the 
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Green Deal, as transactional costs would be lower. This could form part of a 
framework that encouraged householders to choose heat pumps over gas boilers, 
where for example, energy companies provided subsidies for research and mar-
keting to promote this change. 
Acknowledgements 
This research was made possible by EPSRC support for the London-Loughbor- 
ough Centre for Doctoral Research in Energy Demand, grant number EP/ 
H009612/1. 
References 
[1] Monahan,S. and Gemmell, A. (2011) How Occupants Behave and Interact with 
Their Homes. In: Milton K., Ed., The Impact on Energy Use, Comfort, Control and 
Satisfaction. HIS-BRE Press on behalf of the NHBC Foundation, Milton Keynes. 
[2] Lomas, K. (2010) Carbon Reduction in Existing Buildings: A Transdisciplinary Ap-
proach. Building Research & Information, 38, 1-11.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/09613210903350937 
[3] Lowe, R. (2007) Technical Options and Strategies for Decarbonising UK Housing. 
Building Research & Information, 35, 412-425.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/09613210701238268 
[4] Reinders, A., Vringer, K. and Blok, K. (2003) The Direct and Indirect Energy Re-
quirement of Households in the European Union. Energy Policy, 3, 139-153.  
[5] DUKES (2011) Digest of United Kingdom energy statistics.  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/publications/dukes/2303-dukes-2011-c
hapter-1-energy.pdf   
[6] Energy Act. (2011) The National Archives, London. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/16/contents/enacted 
[7] James, P. (2012) Overcoming Barriers to Low Carbon Dwellings: The Need for In-
novative Models of Finance and Service-Provision. Environmental Development, 2, 
6-17.  
[8] Bowen, A. and Rydge, J. (2011) Climate Change Policy in the United Kingdom. 
(August Policy Paper). Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment, London School of Economics, London, 251-269.  
https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg6qdx6b5q6-en 
[9] Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow, Macmillan. London. 
[10] Thaler, R. (2015) Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics. Penguin 
Books, London 
[11] Akerlof, G. and Kranton, R. (2000). Economics and identity .The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 115, 715-753. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554881 
[12] Vale, B. and Vale, R. (2010) Domestic Energy Use, lifestyles and POE: Past Lessons 
for Current Problems. Building Research & Information, 38, 578-588.  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09613218.2010.481438 
[13] Mongin, P. (1997) Expected Utility Theory. In: Davis, J., Hands, W. and Maki,U. 
Eds., Handbook of Economic Methodology., London, 342-350. 
[14] Thaler, R. (1994) Quasi RationalEconomics. Russell Sage Foundation, New York.  
[15] Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. (2009) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness. Penguin, New York.  
S. Hallin et al. 
 
37 
[16] Saunders, H. (1992) The Khazzoom–Brookes Postulate and Neoclassical Growth. 
The Energy Journal, 14, 131-148. 
[17] Sorrell, S. (2007) Energy Group for the Technology and Policy Assessment Function 
of the UK Energy Research Centre. The Rebound Effect: An Assessment of the Evi-
dence for Economy-Wide Energy Savings from Improved Energy Efficiency. UK 
Energy Research Centre, Sussex.  
[18] DECC (2011a) UK Emissions Statistics: 2009 Final UK Figures. Department of 
Energy and Climate Change. 
www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/climate_stats/gg_emissions/uk_emissio
ns/2009_final/2009_final.aspx  
[19] DECC (2011b). UK Emissions Statistics: 2010 Provisional UK Figures. Department 
of Energy and Climate Change.  
www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/climate_stats/gg_emissions/uk_emissio
ns/2010_prov/2010_prov.aspx  
[20] CCC (2008) Building a Low-Carbon Economy—The UK’s Contribution to Tackling 
Climate Change. http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports.  
[21] DECC & AMECO (2013) Eurostat AMECO database. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm  
[22] CCC (2008) Carbon Budgets. The Committee on Climate Change.  
www.theccc.org.uk/carbon-budgets. 
[23] DECC (2011) The Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation Consultation 
Document. DECC. Department of Energy and Climate Change © Crown, London. 
[24] Myers, M.D. (2013) Qualitative Research in Business & Management. 2nd Edition, 
Sage Publications, London. 
[25] Miles, M. and Huberman, A. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Source-
book. 2nd Edition, CA: Sage Publications, Newbury Park. 
[26] Yin, R. (1994) Case Study Research, Design and Methods. 2nd Edition, Sage Publi-
cations, Newbury Park. 
[27] Noy, C. (2008) Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in 
Qualitative Research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11, 
327-344. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570701401305 
[28] Bryman, A. (2008) Social research methods. 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press., 
New York. 
[29] Hallin, S. (2016) Reducing residential Sector Dependence on Fossil Fuels : A Study 
of Motivating Factors. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.689532  
[30] BRE, (2011) Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP 2009). 
http://www.bre.co.uk/sap2009/page.jsp?id=1642  
[31] Hassett, K. and Metcalf, G. (1993) Energy Conservation Investment: Do Consumers 
Discount the Future Correctly? Energy Policy, June, 710-716 
[32] Tol, R. (2007) The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers and Catastrophes. Eco-
nomics Discussion Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2007-2044. 
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/   
[33] Stern, N.H. (2009) A Blueprint for a Safer Planet: How to Manage Climate Change 
and Create a New Era of Progress and Prosperity, Bodley Head, London. 
[34] DECC (2010) The Green Deal. A Summary of the Government’s Proposals. De-
partment of Energy and Climate Change. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479
78/1010-green-deal-summary-proposals.pdf 
S. Hallin et al. 
 
38 
[35] DECC (2014) Domestic Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation in Great Brit-
ain. Monthly report December 2014. Department of Energy and Climate Change. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388
325/Monthly_Statistical_Release_Green_Deal_and_ECO_in_GB_18_Dec.pdf  
[36] Adetutu, M., Glass, A. and Weyman-Jones, T. (2016) Economy-Wide Estimates of 
Rebound Effects: Evidence from Panel Data, The Energy Journal, 37(3). 
[37] Thomas, B. and Azevedo, I. (2013) Estimating Direct and Indirect Rebound Effects 
for US Households with Input-Output Analysis. Ecological Economics, 86, 188-198.  
[38] Chen, L., Lu, L., Tai, M., Hu, S. and Wang, V. (2014) Energy Structure, Energy Pol-
icy, and Economic Sustainable Development. International Review of Economics & 
Finance, 34, 203-210. 
[39] Stroma Certification (2014) 
http://www.stroma.com/certification/software/sap-software-fsap   
S. Hallin et al. 
 
39 
Appendix A 
The SAP procedure was applied to the case study properties in this research. 
Calculations were entered via computer software [39] into a SAP 2009.90 work-
sheet. Overall dimensions of the properties were entered by number of floors 
(area × height). SAP ignores internal walls in the area calculation. Ventilation 
rate data such as number of fans, flues, etc. were also important inputs. The ven-
tilation rate is the rate at which air enters or leaves a building and it is important 
to estimate this as it impacts on the overall heating requirement. In this section 
of the SAP, either the pressure test (air leakiness from the house) results are 
noted or the predefined values in the SAP appendices are applied. Pressure tests 
had not been undertaken on the case study properties so default values were 
used. Had these tests being conducted, it could have meant small differences in 
total predicted energy use in each property. SAP uses a property’s age as a key 
metric in determining predicted energy efficiency. This is because methods of 
construction, building fabric, and insulation levels tend to closely relate to the 
year of construction. None of the properties surveyed as part of this study were 
particularly untypical of the period in which they were built, so where there was 
an absence of property specific data, the use of default values in the modelling 
was unlikely to result in large errors in predicted energy use. 
U-values, which indicate the insulation properties of materials or composite 
materials such as windows, doors, floors and walls, were included in the software 
worksheet. As there were no known actual values, reference was made to per-
formance data tables in the SAP manual. 
SAP estimates a thermal mass parameter based on the noted construction 
elements, such as walls, floors, doors, etc. and the total floor area. The heat loss 
associated with thermal bridges is the linear thermal transmittance. If this data is 
unknown (which was the case for the properties under study) the transmission 
heat transfer coefficient is calculated by reference to Appendix K in the SAP 
manual. 
The number of occupants (which is assumed in SAP, depending on the floor 
area) is used to calculate water heating energy use. SAP takes account of heat 
loss from water storage, but this is not applicable to properties which have a 
combi boiler. 
Boiler efficiency and standing heat loss is also included in the SAP calculation, 
with figures provided from the Product Characteristics Database or the manu-
facturer’s specification. 
Internal gains from occupancy (typically 60 watts × number of occupants) and 
lighting (from SAP Appendix L) are included in the calculation of heating re-
quirements. However electricity for other electrical items and energy required 
for cooking are ignored in the SAP calculation. 
Solar gains are calculated by inputting the latitude of the property and win-
dow orientations. 
SAP assumes a heating period average temperature of 21˚C for the living 
room area of the house with an average of 18˚C for the other areas. 
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To work out the energy use SAP adds up energy use from space heating, water 
heating, ventilation and lighting minus any energy savings from renewable 
energy saving technologies, such as solar PV panels. It converts the calculated 
total energy use which is in kWh into a power consumption figure of 
kWh/annum. The total energy cost for the dwelling is then worked out using 
standardised fuel prices (which are averages by region of prices over the previous 
three years).  
The final SAP rating and the Environmental Impact (EI) rating is derived 
from a scale between 1 and 100. Higher values on the scale are associated with 
lower energy costs for the SAP rating or lower CO2 emissions per annum for the 
EI rating. 
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